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BAHRI YILMAZ
The Role of Trade Strategies for
Economic Development
A Comparison of Foreign Trade Between
Turkey and South Korea
In the 1950s, South Korea (henceforth Korea) and Turkey started out from differ-
ent levels of economic development. Although there were some unique similari-
ties between the two countries, it was obvious that initially Turkey was more of an
advanced country than Korea in economic terms.
Table 1 provides basic data on the growth and transformation of the Korean
and Turkish economy for the 1955 to 1998 period. By 1955, with about the same
population (around twenty million), Turkish per capita income was three times
than that of Korea. Both countries had the same economic structure, and agricul-
ture was playing a dominating role within the economy. Turkish exports were
fifteen times those of Korea, and the Turkish savings rate was much higher than
Korea. Moreover, Korea is land scarce and Turkey is land-abundant with more
generous resource endowment, both in terms of land per person in agriculture, and
in terms of other natural resources.1
During the 1950s, Turkey was one of the most auspicious countries among
others, whereas Korea was occupied and exploited by Japan from 1910 until 1945.
The country was divided and heavily destroyed during the Korean War in 1953.
Since then, the situation has changed in a radical way and Korean per capita in-
come was more than two times higher than that of Turkey  (see Table 1) by 1998.
The share of Turkish export in gross national product (GNP) was almost 50 per-
cent below Korea’s. The Korean economy could have realized the structural change
from the agricultural sector to an industrial one faster than Turkey.
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Main Indicators of Economic Performance
Turkeya Koreaa
1955 1970 1980 1990 1998 1955 1971 1981 1991 1998
Population (million) 22.4 35.6 44.7 56.4 63.4 21.4 32.9 38.7 43.3 46.0
GNP per capita ($) 210 370 1,237 1,884 3,259 70 252 1,592 5,883 7,970
Sectoral share in GNP
Agriculture 41.9 30.0 21.7 16.5 18.5 44.0 27.2 17.4 8.5 6.0
Industry 14.2 22.0 26.5 26.9 19.2 11.2 17.5 32.4 36.8 43.0
Services and others 38.1 42.0 46.7 51.1 623 41.0 55.3 50.2 54.7 51.0
Foreign tradeb
Export (% of GNP) 5.9 5.2 4.6 12.6 13.2 n.a. 11.6 31.9 25.6 38.0
Import (% of GNP) 8.4 7.4 12.9 19.4 22.4 n.a. 25.2 29.1 29.0 46.0
Sources: Bank of Korea, “National Income Statistics” (various dates); OECD, “Surveys for Turkey” (various dates); State Planning Organiza-
tion (DPT), “First Year Development Plan, 1963–1967” (1964); HDTM, “Main Economic Indicators” (various dates); World Bank, “World
Development Report 1999–2000” (2000).
a
 Industry includes manufacturing and mining.
b
 Based on current prices.
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This paper examines the importance of different development strategies—in-
ward- or outward-looking industrialization processes—in foreign trade in Korea
and Turkey. In other words, we attempt to demonstrate the importance of the dif-
ferent development strategies pursued by both countries in the same period and to
explain their effects on foreign trade and international competitiveness. Finally,
we draw some lessons from Korean and Turkish experiences.
Economic Development Policies
Economic Policies in Turkey
The inward-looking development strategy and protectionism became the mode
for most developing countries during the 1930s, and this development strategy
changed little after World War II.2 Turkey and many other developing countries
had to pursue the same development strategy, which aimed to realize the industri-
alization behind protective walls of tariffs and import quotas as a means of saving
foreign exchange for debt payments and import expenditures.
It was a widely held view that rapid industrialization can only be achieved with
the help of the import substitution policy, which emphasized light and later heavy
industry, producing, in the early stages durable consumption goods and, through-
out time, intermediate and capital goods. Second, Turkey, as many other develop-
ing countries, was favorably impressed and influenced by the perceived success of
the Soviet Union in rapid economic development, based on the industrial sector, in
a short period without any significant external assistance.
After an initial period of relatively free trade policies in the 1920s and very low
overall growth, the government decided to introduce a policy of “Etatism” in the
1930s. Within the framework of the new development philosophy and policy, the
government then in power started to heavily intervene in the economy. It helped
launch and sustain an inward-looking strategy, taking into consideration the initial
conditions in structure and industrial organization.
Indeed, in the 1930s, Turkey had to cope with a huge amount of structural and
institutional problems. There was a shortage of entrepreneurs and managers to
undertake activities in private sectors. The private sector had little of both domes-
tic and foreign markets. As a matter of fact, it assigned a leading and dominant role
for the state in economic development with key industries such as manufactured
goods, textiles, railways, telecommunications, and the energy sector.
Under the new state-led and inward-looking development strategy, a number of
State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were established in Turkey, which mainly pro-
duced and marketed a variety of agricultural, mineral, and manufactured com-
modities. Many of these SEEs produced manufactured goods that had previously
been imported. Protectionist measures were put in force to protect the infant indus-
tries from international competition. Throughout the years, the importance of the
SEEs and its share, either in total production or in total employment, grew steadily.
62 RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN FINANCE AND TRADE
From the 1930s until 1980, the inward-looking development strategy played
a major role and was pursued vigorously by all Turkish governments for more
than half a century. Nevertheless, Turkey has succeeded in building a well-di-
versified industrial structure. It has been producing a far greater variety of in-
dustrial goods, including intermediate and capital goods, than most developing
countries. The country has also succeeded in eliminating poverty, improving edu-
cation, health, and the nutritional status of its population, though regional inequali-
ties in income remain and may even be increasing during the whole development
process.
However, it should be noted that these achievements have been obtained at a
high cost. The diversified industrial structure, in most if not all cases, is not inter-
nationally competitive in cost and quality of output. Most of the industries in the
public sector have yielded negligible returns and they have been exceptionally
overemployed.
Although it was obvious that the inward orientation was creating a domestic
industry behind a high protective barrier of tariffs, quotas, and licenses, and al-
lows the inefficient use of resource allocation, inflexible labor markets dominated
by state and price distortions in the economy, it was not seriously questioned by
either the private sector or policymakers as well academicians until 1980.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Turkey’s policymakers recognized that in-
ward orientation led the economy to the economic and social crises that regularly
repeated within every ten-year period, which ended in a “Stand-by Agreement”
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was immediately followed by mili-
tary coups d’état in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The last huge external financing diffi-
culties, which arose from “the first and second oil shocks” in the 1970s, provided
an opportunity for reformers to advance their plans for economic liberalization.
In January 1980, the government announced, under pressure of the IMF and
the World Bank, a series of far-reaching reforms starting with massive devaluation
and an announcement that henceforth there would be frequent adjustments in the
exchange rate to keep pace with differentials between domestic and foreign infla-
tion. Moreover, prices of outputs in public sector enterprises were increased suffi-
ciently to reduce their deficits and thus sharply cut the size of the public sector
deficit. Also, foreign trade reforms were coordinated with a radical shift of poli-
cies away from market intervention, import reliance on market forces, and trade
liberalization.
It was also expected that the outward orientation could bring some benefits for
the Turkish economy such as improved resource allocation in line with social
marginal costs and benefits; access to better technologies, inputs, and intermediate
goods; an economy better able to take advantage of economies of scale and scope;
better education and training; greater domestic competition; and the increase in
employment of highly skilled labor in the production process.
Unfortunately, on grounds of populist and inconsistent policies pursued the
“two steps forward and one step backward” sequence, the outward-looking devel-
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opment strategy put in force in 1980 has been interrupted by significant mistakes
made by Turkish policymakers in the 1990s. Today, inflation and unemployment
remain a major concern of the Turkish economy once again.
Economic Policies in Korea
Korea’s postwar economic history can be divided into four phases corresponding
to changes in the development strategy and economic policy regime.3
After the Korean War, the country faced the common economic features of an
undeveloped country, rapid inflation, low level of savings and investments and
balance-of-payments difficulties, external borrowing requirements, a scarcity of
basic consumption goods, and lack both experience and efficient administrative
structure. During the period 1955–1961, as with other developing countries, in-
dustrial policy focused on import substitution of nondurable consumer and inter-
mediate goods. The Korean economy was heavily dependent on a large inflow of
U.S. foreign aid.
Kuznets points out that there were certain changes taking place during this
period, which, whether intentionally or not, laid the manufacturing base needed to
launch an export-promotion strategy (see Kuznets 1988). For instance, entrepre-
neurial experience was accumulating with the establishment of a number of new
enterprises, education at all levels was expanding rapidly. Land reform in Korea
also helped bring about equality of opportunities.
By the early 1960s, sufficient changes had occurred for Korea to be ready for
takeoff and industrial development. Of these, changes in land ownership, less costly
but well-educated labor force, and entrepreneurial capability were especially im-
portant. At the beginning of the 1960s, the Korean government switched the
economy from import substitution to export promotion. It was designed to utilize
the nation’s comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing goods.
In the 1970s, Korea faced political and economic changes that convinced
policymakers in Seoul to shift economic policy from general export promotion to
targeting heavy and chemical industries (HCI). One of the reasons was that, by the
late 1960s, Korea began to face import restrictions on labor intensive and light
manufactured exports to the United States and other developed countries. At the
same time, the country faced serious challenges from China and Newly Industrial-
ized Countries (NICs) for labor-intensive products in the world markets. Ultimately,
the Korean government decided to establish the HCI as the next group of leading
industries.
By 1979, the government faced serious economic problems: high inflation, a
rem of trade loss stemming from the second oil shock and over investment. A
macroeconomic stabilization plan was accompanied by a liberalization of struc-
tural policies. Important changes occurred in policies governing financial mar-
kets, international trade, foreign direct investments, and privatization and
competition law. Furthermore, labor laws and industrial relations were changed,
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allowing a sharp increase in the number of unions and members, but also leading
to a rising number of disputes.
In connection with these highlights, Korea followed “market and growth”
friendly macro/microeconomic policy, encouraged savings, and favored invest-
ments in physical and human capital, through low-budget deficits and inflation.
Exports of manufacturing goods were promoted.4 In contrast, Turkey lived with
the import-substitution policy over the decades and has only since 1980 opened its
economy with a go-stop policy.
Development of Foreign Trade in Korea and Turkey
By 1954 the total export of Korea amounted to around $18 million, whereas Tur-
key was exporting almost $335 million in the same year. The ratio of exports to
Korean GNP was only 2.4 percent as of 1962, but it rose to 11.6 percent in 1971,
and to around 30 percent in the 1998. The share of export in Turkish GNP ac-
counted already was 6.0 percent as of 1962 and had a decreasing tendency and
dropped to 4.2 percent in 1980. Export started to increase due to fundamental
changes in the Turkish foreign trade regime introduced in 1980 and reached to
13.2 percent in 1998.
As far as the distribution of Korean and Turkish foreign trade into regions is
concerned, both countries are involved in trade with different regions and markets
of the world. The OECD and the EC/EU countries were, for Turkey, concerned in
the important markets since the 1950s, whereas North America, especially the
United States, was the favored market for Korean production.5
The amount of trade (imports plus exports) between Turkey and the OECD,
including EU countries, grew all the time. Germany was and still is the most im-
portant trading partner of share and the United States in Turkey’s foreign trade
seems to be insignificant. At this stage of trade no other markets in the region
could challenge and replace the markets of the European Community. The eco-
nomic links between Turkey and the European Union would intensify with the
entrance of Turkey into the Customs Union in 1996. On the other hand, the Ko-
rean market share in North American markets began to increase after 1983 and
peaked in 1988. Afterward, it shows the decreasing tendency for two main rea-
sons: made in China and other NICs; and second, the recession in the United States
and the protectionist measures from the United States. Immediately, Korea re-
placed its export markets from North America to Asian NICs and Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to neutralize its market share loss in
the NAFTA through market diversification (Lee 1995).
Methodology
In order to measure and calculate the competitiveness of both countries in trade as
a whole and manufactured trade, we use the following indices:
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1. Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCAs), using Bella Balassa’s and there-
after-modified formula (1965).6
2. Comparative Export Performance Formula.7
3. For the calculation of the overall importance of intra-industry in comparison
with inter-industry specialization in international trade, including the
economy as a whole and manufactured sector for Korea and Turkey, we
have used the Country-specific Trade Overlap (TO) formula (Finger and De
Rosa 1979).8
To realize all of these purposes, the manufacturing trade sector values are also
classified (see the Appendix) in five different groups:9
Raw material-intensive goods (SITC 0, 2, 26, 3–35, 4, 56)
Labor-intensive goods (SITC 26, 6–62, 67, 68, 8–87, 88)
Capital-intensive goods (SITC 1, 35, 53, 55, 62, 67, 68, 78)
Easy imitable research-intensive goods (SITC 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 75, 76)
Difficult imitable research-intensive goods (SITC 57, 7–75, 76, 78, 87, 88)
The development and distribution of Korean and Turkish foreign trade accord-
ing to sub-sectors are also reported in the Appendix.
Empirical Results
Revealed Comparative Advantage (Specialization Structure)
As a first step, we attempt to measure the international competitiveness of Korea
and Turkey with the help of RCA indices and comparing the two. Taking exports
and imports together in consideration, RCAs describe a comparative advantage or
disadvantage in international trade. The disaggregation of exports indicates where
the domestic industries display international competitiveness and the disaggrega-
tion of import shows wherein such uncompetitiveness lies.
RCA indices have been calculated using the following formula (Balassa 1965):
n n
i j i i
i i
X M X M
1 1
RCA ln / / 100,
= =
Ê ˆÈ ˘= ¥Á ˜Î ˚Ë ¯Â Â (1)
where X and M denote exports and imports, respectively, and i refers to a group at
a one- (or two-) digit SITC level. The higher (lower) the RCA index, the more
(less) successful the trade performance of the country in question is in a particular
area of industry. RCA indices have been computed for the years 1977 to 1996.
It is well-known that RCA indices describe the trade patterns that have taken
place. They are calculated on actual export and import flows. The empirical re-
sults (Table 2) of RCA indices for Korea and Turkey reflect the stages of the












The Revealed Comparative Advantage: Sorted SITC Code (1977–1996)
Labor-intensive Capital-intensive Easily imitated Difficult to imitate
Raw material goods goods goods goods
Year K TR K TR K TR K TR K TR
1977 –112 41 155 174 –29 –22 –50 –194 –60 –335
1978 –118 16 160 191 –32 8 –35 –267 –68 –346
1979 –129 9 165 184 24 31 –27 –287 –71 –268
1980 –160 –14 169 185 70 50 –15 –147 –44 –184
1981 –173 –18 169 184 69 52 –21 –202 –28 –161
1982 –188 –13 153 185 77 55 –39 –204 –1 –161
1983 –163 –14 148 178 44 31 –30 –190 –2 –146
1984 –155 –19 141 184 40 34 –21 –216 –10 –163
1985 –153 –36 145 170 47 49 –12 –167 –17 –122
1986 –143 14 136 170 34 11 –8 –163 –55 –196
1987 –147 –17 133 156 31 –18 7 –122 –67 –92
1988 –155 –5 130 144 33 9 3 –103 –57 –162
1989 –160 –32 132 156 22 17 10 –82 –50 –201
1990 –174 –29 127 147 24 14 19 –84 –39 –192
1991 –162 –8 118 139 12 10 24 –104 –28 –187
1992 –170 –12 111 136 42 4 36 –114 –27 –162
1993 –177 –10 103 131 51 5 32 –113 –20 –175
1994 –174 –22 90 121 31 30 32 –113 –10 –151
1995 –137 –21 58 57 5 –48 13 –192 –21 –203
1996 –127 –46 44 23 15 –79 19 –205 –25 –214
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, various dates.
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for understanding the trade pattern and the structure of comparative advantage.10
The empirical results of RCAs indices are interpreted separately below.
During the 1980s, Korea’s comparative advantage in international market
changed dramatically and Turkey’s specialization structure made essential progress,
especially after switching the development strategy outward in 1980. In other words,
the range between the index values of the greatest comparative advantage and those
of the greatest comparative disadvantage has narrowed the rank order. As evidenced
by the results, Korea and Turkey had a dominating comparative advantage in labor-
intensive goods. This was playing a leading role in the economic development of the
two countries. In the observed time period, trade structures of both economies were
based mainly on labor-intensive goods and partly on capital-intensive goods.
It is interesting to note that Korea’s comparative advantage in labor-intensive
products has had a decreasing tendency since 1977, whereas its dependency on
raw materials has increased steadily throughout that time. This fact can be ex-
plained by two factors. First, in 1988, Korea’s market share had already reached
its peak in the U.S. market, and afterward it began to decrease because of the
rushing of products exported by China and Asian NICs and ASEAN into the North
American markets. Second, the recession in the United States and protectionist
measures taken by the U.S. government have contributed of Korea’s loss of com-
petitiveness in these markets. However, the Korean economy reacted very quickly
and the loss in North America has been compensated and supplemented by the
increased market share in Asian NICs and ASEAN due to market diversification
policies and the rapid economic growth of these countries. Turkey’s major export
market is as before the EU market. At the same time Turkey has also faced a hard
competitive pressure by the NICs exporting labor-intensive products and having
import restrictions introduced by the European Commission. Therefore, the com-
parative advantage concerning labor-intensive products began to go down slightly.
It is clear that Korea has a great disadvantage in trade with raw materials as
compared to Turkey. The main reason is that both countries are non–oil-producing
countries and are heavily dependent on crude oil import and an essential part of
their imports consists of oil. In contrast to Korea, Turkey was able to set off the
negative effects of oil imports by exporting primary products, mainly agricultural
products. Even the strong position of Turkey in exporting agricultural products
could not avoid comparative disadvantages in raw materials.
Besides labor-intensive goods, RCA indices show that Korea and Turkey, except
in 1987 and 1992, also have comparative advantages in capital-intensive goods. But
this group of goods does not play a dominating role within the trade of both countries
as compared to the labor-intensive goods. Noticeably, the results do not indicate or
give a clear-cut picture of what the future role of the capital-intensive goods in inter-
national trade will be and which pattern of specialization will be followed?
Findings for “easy (EIRG) and difficult (DIRG) imitable research-oriented
goods” indicate that Korea and Turkey (except in 1987 and 1992) have comparative
disadvantages, but in different ranges and degrees. Between the two countries,
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Korea is the country that was able to push the export substitution further, and has
been starting to replace labor- and capital-intensive goods for easy imitable goods
starting in 1987. Now, Korea has gained the comparative advantage in EIRG. On
the other hand, although since 1977, Turkey has succeeded in reducing its great
disadvantage in EIRG, but it has not been able to pass into the comparative advan-
tage zone.
As far as the DIRG are concerned, both countries obviously had comparative
disadvantages. Korea had shown a great effort to reduce comparative disadvan-
tages concerning these types of goods between 1977 and 1996. Turkey’s position
also made an essential improvement since 1977, but it is out of the question that
the country is close to the position that Korea has already achieved. It is noticeable
that the share of the DIRG in Korea and Turkey’s imports is quite high. But Korea
has successfully increased its share in total export since 1977. In other words, it
seems that there is a close relationship between the import and export of the DIRG,
whereas this relationship for Turkey seems to be insignificant and weak.
Comparative Export Performance
As a second step, we estimate the structure of international competitiveness for
Korea and Turkey for 1980, 1985, and 1996. With that, we intend to, first, avoid
the impact of distorted results of RCAs caused by trade interventions and, second,
to find out if the findings of comparative export performance (CEP) support our
earlier RCA results. In order to realize our purpose, the manufacturing trade sector
has been broken up and simplified into a one-digit commodity (SITC 0–9). For the
estimation of CEP coefficients, the following formula is used:
( ) ( )ij iw ij iwX X X XCEP / / / ,= Â Â (2)
where j and w refer to the country in question and the world, respectively. Index
values above (below) unity means that the particular sectors have a greater (lower)
share in total exports of the individual country than they have in the world as a
whole. Thus, the country in question possesses a relative advantage (disadvan-
tage) in the export of these products.
The results for CEP are summarized in Table 3 and give us the opportunity to
draw the following conclusions for main sectors. To begin with, Turkey appears to
lead in the export of agricultural products (SITC 0) and capital-intensive goods,
such as beverages and tobacco (SITC 1). Turkey has been able to reduce compara-
tive disadvantages due to increasing export performance in animal and vegetable
oils (SITC 4) since 1980. Compared with 1980, Turkey made essential progress in
exports of manufactured goods (SITC 6 and 8), which are mainly considered as
labor-intensive goods. It seems that Turkey has advanced more in textiles (SITC
6.5) and in clothing (SITC 8.4) in trade with the world. As the results show, the
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Turkish economy had disadvantages in mineral fuels (SITC 3), chemicals, and
machinery and transport equipment (SITC 5 and 7).
In the case of Korea, the results show that the Korean economy has lost the
relative weight of its initial export performance in agricultural products, crude
materials, and animal and vegetable oils (SITC 0, 2, 4), as well as chemicals (SITC
5). Again, as with Turkey, Korea has had disadvantages in mineral fuels (SITC 3).
It has kept its relative competitiveness in the basic and miscellaneous manufac-
tured goods (SITC 6 and 8) with a decreasing tendency, whereas it has been able to
improve its export performance with respect to manufactured products, machin-
ery, and transport equipment (SITC 7). Again CEPs also show that Korea, in fact,
is an economy that is on the way to complete the second (labor-intensive goods)
stage of export substitution and export diversification processes. It has achieved a
relative advantage compared to Turkey in the export of investment goods in trade
with the world.
In short, in the case of both countries, the patterns of RCAs, based on import-
export ratios, are generally confirmed by the CEPs. It can be argued that both
countries are now in the different stages of export diversification policies. There
are some certain similarities between Turkey and Korea concerning “early indus-
tries” such as textiles, wearing and footwear but Korea has already achieved a
favorable export performance in world trade in some “easy and difficult imitable
research intensive goods,” whereas Turkey has revealed a more favorable export
performance mainly in the “raw materials-oriented goods” such as agricultural
products, “capital intensive goods” such as food industries, and “labor-intensive
goods” such as textiles.
Table 3
Comparative Export Performance: SITC (0–9)
1980 1985 1988 1996
Code K TR K TR K TR K TR
0 and 1 0.72 4.94 0.44 2.7 0.42 2.54 0.08 0.29
2 0.29 3.11 0.18 1.40 0.20 1.17 0.28 0.12
3 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.24 0.10 0.30 0.51 0.04
4 0 0.40 0 1.27 0 1.60 0 0.46
5 0.60 0.36 0.38 0.47 0.33 0.88 0.31 0.03
6 and 8 2.67 0.89 2.04 2.01 1.78 1.76 1.05 0.39
7 0.78 0.10 1.18 0.25 1.18 0.18 0.70 0.03
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, various dates.
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Intra- and Inter-Industry Trade: Trade Overlap
As a further step, we consider the overall importance of intra-industry in compari-
son to inter-industry specialization for Korea and Turkey in international trade. As
it is known, world trade in monopolistic competition consists of two parts. There
is two-way trade within the manufacturing sector. This exchange of manufactures
for manufactures is called intra-industry trade and an exchange of manufactures
for food is called inter-industry trade.
The intra-industry trade implies how and to what extent the country in ques-
tion is already integrated into the world market and the degree of liberalization in
which the economy has already specialized throughout the economic develop-
ment process.
In order to calculate the coefficients of a country specific TO, the following
formula (Finger and De Rosa 1979) has been used:
( ) ( )n ni i i i
i i
X M X M
1 1
TO 2 min , / ,
= =
= +Â Â (3)
where Xi and Mi refer to exports and imports, respectively, of which the SITC 0–9
production sectors i, and min defines the magnitude of the total trade, which over-
laps in dollar terms. The coefficient can vary between zero to one. The closer it
comes to unity, the more intra-industry specialization there is. A lower coefficient
implies that trade takes the form of inter-industry specialization.
The TO results for Korea and Turkey with the world have been considered in
two parts. In the first part, it shows the TOs as a whole, and in the second part,
according to our SITC classification, which are represented in Tables 4 and 5.
The TO coefficient as a whole for Turkey is lower than Korea between 1987
and 1996 and TOs for Turkey remained almost unchanged since 1987. This means
that Turkey in trade with the world mainly reflects inter-industry specialization.
The TO results for Korea are slightly higher than Turkey. It is obvious that Korea
made a remarkable improvement to increase TOs since 1987 and at this stage the
Korean economy occupies an intermediate position.
Table 4
Trade Overlap Coefficients (total)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1995 1996
Korea 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.76 0.77






Trade Overlap Coefficient According to Subgroups
Easy to imitate Difficult to imitate
Labor-intensive Capital-intensive research-oriented research-oriented
Raw materials goods goods goods goods
Year K TR K TR K TR K TR K TR
1987 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.38 0.55 0.67 0.42 0.35 0.74 0.45
1988 0.36 0.32 0.31 0.44 0.50 0.77 0.44 0.45 0.80 0.28
1989 0.32 0.40 0.35 0.43 0.61 0.78 0.44 0.49 0.76 0.19
1990 0.27 0.40 0.40 0.52 0.62 0.67 0.48 0.40 0.77 0.16
1991 0.30 0.29 0.47 0.54 0.64 0.72 0.51 0.37 0.80 0.18
1992 0.29 0.29 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.72 0.52 0.34 0.83 0.23
1995 0.14 0.69 0.33 0.67 0.45 0.84 0.45 0.27 0.48 0.26
1996 0.15 0.56 0.36 0.82 0.42 0.70 0.45 0.23 0.49 0.26
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, various dates.
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As far as the subsectors are concerned, Turkey has only intra-industry specializa-
tion in capital-intensive goods and partially in labor-intensive goods. In other groups
of goods Turkey shows the characteristics of an inter-industry trade with the world.
Korean economy indicates the features of intra-industry trade in the difficult
imitable research goods and partially in easy imitable research goods. It seems to
be the best way to realize the full intra-industry specialization concerning this type
of goods in trade with the world, whereas in the other groups it demonstrates the
typical industrialization patterns of developing countries.
As it is known, the relative importance of intra- and inter-industry depends on
the similarity of countries and how similar the capital labor ratios are. If they are
different, there will be a relatively low level of intra-industry trade and it will be
based on comparative advantage. However, it must be remembered that models of
imperfect competition can explain intra-industry trade but cannot by themselves
explain why some countries are net exporters of certain manufactures and net
importers of other goods. Therefore, the results of TO must be combined and in-
terpreted with RCAs to explain the whole trade pattern.
Conclusion
It is commonly accepted that the manufacturing sector is the leading and dominat-
ing sector and beyond that it is one of the main determinants of economic growth
rates, employment growth rates, and growth rates of productivity in an economy.
It seems to be obvious that the rapid growth of Korean GNP was closely associ-
ated with rapid export growth, which, in turn, pushed the rapid growth of employ-
ment. The close relationship between economic growth and the growth rate of
exports has already been proved by numerous empirical studies throughout time.
For example, Krueger made partial explanations for the association between ex-
port growth and GNP growth in East Asian NICs (see Krueger 1990).
First, the results indicate that there is a strong contrast by implementation of the
protectionism between Korea and Turkey. Korea followed export and import sub-
stitution policies at the same time and these were closely interrelated to one an-
other. As Krueger underlined, Korean and other East Asian economies had highly
protective trade regimes before they embarked on their export-oriented trade and
development strategies, and by switching strategies from inward to outward they
achieved gains by realizing their comparative advantage. The switching of trade
strategy from inward- to outward-looking took place, not through trade liberaliza-
tion or reduction of import protection (“free trade” route to outward orientation),
but rather by enacting a strong set of export promotion measures to match anti-
export bias created as a result of tariff and nontariff import barriers (a subsidy
route to outward orientation).
On one hand, export activities occurred under free trade conditions and, addi-
tionally, export was promoted through a very complex system of trade incentives.
On the other hand, import substitution industries are protected with the help of
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various trade policies. Throughout the 1980s Korea introduced new trade reforms
to reduce import protection and to liberalize its import regime to a large extent.
This means that Korea implemented import liberalization and abolished the ex-
port subsidy route at the same time (see Nam 1993).
In contrast, Turkey’s trade policy was heavily based on the protection of the
import substitution industries and continued uninterrupted. There was no inten-
tion by policymakers in Ankara to shift trade strategy from inward to outward
orientation until 1980. It is interesting to notice that despite some input subventions
served to farmers in agricultural sectors, Turkey generally paid no attention to the
export promotion measures and followed a one-way trade policy (Togan 1993, pp.
62, 169). In the 1980s, Turkey changed its trade policy so that import liberaliza-
tion was selective, aggressively followed, and export promotion measures were
put in force to encourage domestic producers to export their products.
Second, the chief difference between the two countries is that in Turkey protec-
tion was too comprehensive and too little attention was paid to the possibility of
exporting manufactures to complement import substitution. Because of the inward-
oriented development strategy, it is clear that Turkey has failed to take advantage of
opportunities offered by growing world trade. In other words, Korea’s “outward-
oriented” strategy is the characteristic of its development most commonly singled
out as the key to success. Rather than pushing inefficient import substitution for its
small and domestic market, Korea has persisted in outward-oriented growth.
Third, it should be noted that there were different attitude patterns between
Korean and Turkish politicians and administration. Korean policymakers were
determined to maintain the macroeconomic stability over almost three decades
and to switch the development strategy from import substitution to export substi-
tution. By contrast, decisionmakers in Ankara aggressively pursued the import
substitution policy without any intention of shifting the strategy from inward to
outward. They did not take care of macroeconomic stability and pursued populist
macroeconomic policies that engendered debt crises and hyperinflation. The trade
reform in 1980 did not take place voluntarily or as a result of aimed export substi-
tution policies, but due to pressure from the international organizations, which
made trade liberalization a central condition for external lending.
Fourth, it is generally accepted that Korea is an export-led economy with ex-
ports as the engine of economic and manufacturing growth. As a result, Korean
industrial production rose forty-five-fold between 1960 and 1984, whereas Turk-
ish industrial production was 6.6 times higher in the same period (Krueger 1987,
pp. 39ff). The growth of exports stimulates growth of investment, consumption,
and import. It is argued that an increase in foreign demand determined a rapid
expansion of Korea’s exports and an improvement in the trade balance as well as
national income and domestic savings. Obviously, there is a close relationship
between export growth and gross domestic savings, which helped the country to
realize higher levels of investment, especially in the export-oriented sectors. On
the other hand, Korea was able to finance its import requirements for investment
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goods with the help of export revenues. It is interesting to notice that Korea be-
came a net capital exporter in the form of foreign direct investment after 1986.
Therefore, the domestic savings ratio increased from only eight-tenths of 1 per-
cent of GNP in 1960 to well over 20 percent in the late 1970s and around 36.2
percent in 1991 (Nam 1993, p. 11).
By contrast, Turkey’s savings ratio remained almost at the same level, and the
difference between gross domestic investment and savings was mainly set off by
official external borrowing, where foreign direct investments were negligible and
remained around 2 to 3 percent of the GNP. Domestic savings rose from 14 per-
cent in 1960 to over 16.4 percent in 1983 and 23.7 percent in 1990 (Togan 1993, p.
14). Economic growth in Turkey was based, prior to 1980, on domestic demand
and borrowing from abroad had been strong.
Fifth, in many research works it is argued that NICs in East Asia have had a
strong outward orientation and therefore productivity growth. In order to under-
stand the factors behind the growth of output in East Asian NICs and Turkey due
to different trade strategies, it is necessary as a first step to compare annual growth
of output per capita, which reflects standards of living and annual growth of out-
put per worker in terms of labor productivity based on the data of 118 countries
(Young 1994). As a second step, the “annual growth of total factor productivity”
are compared for Turkey, Korea, and others. The crucial characteristic of Korea
and other East Asian NICs is not that they have had remarkable rapid productivity
growth in manufactures but, rather, they had successfully expanded investment
and employment in manufactures and they were able to combine it with an export-
oriented development strategy (Dornbusch and Park 1987, pp. 389ff.). Further-
more, their long-term oriented macro- and micropolicies were stable and based
mainly on encouraged savings, with favoring investment in physical and human
capital, through low-budget deficits and modest inflation. Exports of manufac-
tures were promoted with gradual import competition. In general, factor accumu-
lation, of both capital and labor, explains the lion’s share of Korean economic
growth, both in the economy as a whole and in the manufacturing sector. During
the period 1963–1990, total factor productivity (TFP) increased at an average rate
of 2.4 percent in Korea, accounting for about one-fourth of total output growth,
which depends mainly on scale economies and advances in knowledge (Pilat 1993).
In contrast to Korea, Turkey has based its economic development on needs in
the domestic market, and mainly concentrated itself on the protection, to some
extent of its inefficient domestic industry from international competition. Growth
of output was heavily determined by the accumulation of capital throughout the
import substitution period.11 It is remarkable that the contribution of capital to
output growth was higher than labor input in Turkey in the period of outward
orientation between 1980 and 1992. In this period, TFP increased at an average
rate of almost 0.9 percent. Labor input expanded less rapidly during the 1980s.
But the shares of investment were faster than labor input. It is noticeable that TFP
growth was less than half of the growth of output. The success of the Turkish
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economy could be explained partly by outward orientation in the 1980s. Another
possible interpretation of this trend in TFP growth is a shift in labor from import-
able to export-oriented activities and, by that time, put idle capacity to use.
Sixth, one of the essential requirements of the outward-looking strategy, with
rapid and sustained economic growth is the numbers of a well-qualified labor
force and highly educated human capital accumulation. It is generally agreed that
one of the cornerstones of Korean economic growth is a highly trained and pro-
ductive labor force, which is preconditioned for the high rates of investment and
capacity expansion that made rapid export growth possible. The success story of
Korea demonstrates the importance of a government’s export push policy and
ability to foresee a major trend coordinate with complementary investments for
education and vocational training together.
In conclusion, Turkey and other developing countries, which implemented poli-
cies of import substitution and industrialization behind high protection and iso-
lated from international competition, failed to adopt policies suitable to rapid
economic growth. The import substitution led to a financial instability, accelerat-
ing inflation, bitter industrial conflicts, and balance-of-payments crisis, which re-
peated itself regularly and ended with a military takeover and implementation of
an “Economic Stabilization Program,” imposed by the IMF and the World Bank
seventeen times until March 2001.
Notes
1. A similar research work, but in a different context, was done by Anne Krueger
(1987).
2. The Turkish experience has led to sizable recent literature and research works that
are more important (see Celasun and Rodrik 1989; Krueger and Aktan 1992; Önis and
James 1993).
3. Among numerous researches works published about the Korean economy, see, for
example, Dornbusch and Park (1987), Kuznets (1988), Lau (1990), and Lee (1994).
4. Dornbusch and Park (1987) summarizes the growth, transformation, and success
story of Korea since the early 1960s as a sustained, exceptionally high growth rate of out-
put; a structural transformation of the economy, in terms of both output and employment,
with a substantial decline in agriculture, a rise in manufacturing, and a growing importance
of trade; a significant increase in public sector resources; a sustained high rate of invest-
ment; larger, but declining, external financing.
5. United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, various dates.
6. Balassa (1965) originally developed the methodology—“Trade Liberalization and
“Revealed Comparative Advantage”—and was refined thereafter.
7. For methodology, see Donges et al. (1982).
8. For details on the methodology and its analytical applications, see Finger and De
Rosa (1979).
9. For more details, see Hufbauer and Chilas (1974) and Klodt (1990).
10. The results for Turkey and Korea could be distorted by trade policy interventions,
especially in the form of tariff and nontariff barriers on imports and export subsidies on
exports as well. Therefore, the results for both countries should be interpreted carefully.
11. See OECD Surveys for Turkey (1990–1991 and 1995, pp. 91 and 82, respectively).
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Appendix
SITC Classification
Raw Material-Intensified Goods (RMIG)
SITC 0 Food and Live Animals
SITC 2 Crude Materials Excluding Fuels
SITC 3 Mineral Fuels, etc.
SITC 4 Animal Fat and Vegetable Oil
Labor-Intensive Goods (LIG)
SITC 26 Textile Fibers and Waste
SITC 6 Basic Manufactured Goods
SITC 8 Miscellaneous Manufactured Goods
Capital-Intensive Goods (CIG)
SITC 1 Beverages and Tobacco
SITC 35 Electrical Energy
SITC 53 Dyes, Tanning, Color Production
SITC 55 Perfume, Cleaning, etc., Production
SITC 62 Rubber Manufactures N.E.S.
SITC 67 Iron and Steel
SITC 68 Nonferrous Metals
SITC 78 Road Vehicles
Easy Imitable Research-Oriented Goods (EIRG)
SITC 51 Organic Chemicals
SITC 52 Inorganic Chemicals
SITC 54.1 Medical and Pharmaceutical Products
SITC 58 Plastic Materials, etc.
SITC 59 Chemical Materials N.E.S.
SITC 75 Office Machines and Adapt Equipment
Difficult Imitable Research-Oriented Goods (DIRG)
SITC 7 Machines, Transport Equipment
SITC 87 Precision Instrument
SITC 88 Photo Equipment, Optical Goods, etc.
